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Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness 
Francis Crick and Christo] Koch 
Visual awareness is a favorable form of consciousness to study 
neurobiologically. We propose that it takes two forms: a very 
fast form, linked to iconic memory, that may be difficult to 
study; and a somewhat slower one involving visual attention 
and short-term memory. In the slower form an attentional 
mechanism transiently binds together all those neurons whose 
activiry relates to the relevant features of a single visual object. 
We suggest this is done by generating coherent semi-
syru:hronous oscillations, probably in the 40-70Hz range. 
These oscillations then activate a transient short-term 
(working) memory. We outline several lines of experimental 
work that might advance the understanding of the neural 
mechanisms involved. The neural basis of very short-term 
memory espedally needs more experimental study. 
Key words: consciousness I attention I binding I 40 Hz 
oscillations I short· term memory 
IT IS REMARKABLE that most of the work in both 
cognitive science and the neurosciences makes no 
reference to consciousness (or 'awareness'), especially 
as many would regard consciousness as the major 
puzzle confronting the neural view of the mind and 
indeed at the present time it appears deeply 
mysterious to many people. This attitude is partly 
a legacy of behaviorism and partly because most 
workers in these areas cannot see any useful way of 
approaching the problem. In the last few years 
several books have appearedl-4 that address the 
question directly but most of these1-3 have been 
written largely from a functional standpoint and so 
have said rather little about neurons and other 
machinery of the brain. 
We suggest that the time is now ripe for an attack 
on the neural basis of consciousness. Moreover, 
we believe that the problem of consciousness 
can, in the long run, be solved only by explanations 
at the neural level. Arguments at the Cognitive level 
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are undoubtedly important but we doubt whether 
they will, by themselves, ever be sufficiently 
compelling to explain consciousness in a convincing 
manner. Attempting to infer the internal structure 
of a very complex system using a 'black-box' 
approach (i.e. manipulating the input variables while 
observing the output of the system) will never lead 
to unique answers. In short, such methods are not 
by themselves powerful enough ever to solve a 
problem, though they are good enough to suggest 
tentative solutions. 
Our basic idea is that consciousness depends 
crucially on some form of rather short-term memory 
and also on some form of serial attentional 
mechanism. This attentional mechanism helps sets 
of the relevant neurons to fire in a coherent semi-
oscillatory way, probably at a frequency in the 40-70 
Hz range, so that a temporary global unity is 
imposed on neurons in many different parts of the 
brain. These oscillations then activate short-term 
(working) memory. In the later parts of the paper 
we shall be mainly concerned with visual awareness. 
Before approaching the problem in detail, it seems 
sensible to describe our general approach to conscious-
ness and to decide what aspects of it are best left on 
one side .. 
Prolegomenon to the study of consciousness 
We make two basic assumptions. The first is that there 
is something that requires a scientific explanation. 
There is general agreement that we are not conscious 
of all the processes going on in our heads, though 
exactly which might be a matter of dispute. While 
we are aware of many of the results of perceptual 
and memory processes, we have only limited access 
to the processes that produce this awareness (e.g. 
"How did I come up with the first name of my 
grandfather?"). In fact, some psychologists5 have 
argued that we have only very limited introspective 
access to the origins of even higher order cognitive 
processes. It seems probable, however, that at any 
one moment some active neuronal processes correlate 
with consciousness, while others do not. What are 
the differences between them? 
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The second assumption is tentative: that all the 
different aspects of consciousness, for example pain 
and visual awareness, employ a basic common 
mechanism or perhaps a few such mechanisms. If 
we understand the mechanisms for one aspect, we 
will have gone most of the way to understanding 
them all. Paradoxically, consciousness appears to. be 
so odd and, at first sight, so difficult to understand 
that only a rather special explanation is likely to 
work. The general nature of consciousness may be 
easier to discover than more mundane operations, 
such as shape-from-shading, that could, in principle, 
be explained in many different ways. Whether this 
is really true remains to be seen. 
The following topics will be left on one side or our 
attitude to them stated without further discussion, 
for experience has shown that otherwise much time 
can be frittered away in fruitless argument about 
them. 
1. Everyone has a rough idea of what is meant 
by consciousness. We feel that it is better to avoid 
a precise definition of consciousness because of the 
dangers of premature defmition. Until we understand 
the problem much better, any attempt at a formal 
definition is likely to be either misleading or overly 
restrictive, or both. 
2. Arguments about what consciousness is for 
are probably premature, although such an approach 
may give a few hints about its nature. It is, after all, 
a bit surprising that one should worry too much 
about the function of something when we are rather 
vague about what it is. 
3. We shall assume that some species of 
animals, and in particular the higher mammals, 
possess some of the essential features of consciousness, 
but not necessarily all. For this reason, appropriate 
experiments on such animals may be relevant to 
finding the mechanisms underlying consciousness. 
3 .1. From this it follows that a language system 
(of the type found in humans) is not essential 
for consciousness. That is, one can have the key 
features of consciousness without language. This is 
not to say that language may not enrich conscious-
ness considerably. 
3. 2. We consider that it is not profitable at this 
stage to argue about whether 'lower' animals, such 
as octopus, Drosophila or nematodes, are conscious. 
It is probable, though, that consciousness correlates 
to some extent with the degree of complexity of any 
nervous system. 
4. There are many forms of consciousness, such 
as those associated with seeing, thinking, emotion, 
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pain and so on. We shall assume that self-conscious-
ness, that is the self-referential aspect of consciousness, 
is merely a special case of consciousness and is better 
left on one side for the moment. Volition and 
intentionality will also be disregarded and also 
various rather unusual states, such as the hypnotic 
state, lucid dreaming and sleep walking, unless they 
turn out to have special features that make them 
experimentally advantageous. 
5. No neural theory of consciousness will explain 
everything about consciousness, at least not initially. 
We will first attempt to construct a rough scaffold, 
explaining some of the dominant features and hope 
that such an attempt will lead to more inclusive and 
refined models. 
6. There is also the problem of qualia. 6 Some 
argue that certain aspects of consciousness (such as 
whether the red I see is the same as the red you see), 
being essentially private, cannot in principle be 
addressed by any objective, scientific study. We feel 
that this difficult issue is, for the moment, best left 
on one side. Our present belief is that it may prove 
possible, in the fullness oftime, to make it plausible 
that you see red as I do (assuming that psychophysical 
tests suggest you do). To decide whether one can 
make a plausible case or not we shall need to know 
the exact neural correlate in a human brain of seeing 
red. Whatever the outcome, we believe that any 
adequate theory of consciousness should explain how 
we see color at all. · 
This outlines the framework within which we will 
address the problem of consciousness. We ne.?Ct ask 
what psychology can tell us about the phenomenon. 
The cognitive approach 
The most effective way to approach the problem of 
consciousness would be to use the descriptions of 
psychologists and cognitive scientists and attempt to 
map different aspects of their models onto what is 
known about the neuroanatomy and neurophysiology 
of the brain. Naturally we have attempted to do this 
but have not found it as useful as one might hope, 
although such models do point to the importance of 
attention and short-term memory and suggest that 
consciousness should have easy access to the higher, 
planning levels of the motor system. 
A major handicap is the pernicious influence of 
the paradigm of the von Neumann digital computer. 
It is a painful business to try to translate the various 
boxes labeled 'files', 'CPU', 'character buffer', and 
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~o on o~curring in psychological models, each with 
Its special meth.o~s ofpr~cessing, into the language 
of neuronal actiVIty and mteraction. This is mainly 
because present-day computers make extensive use 
of precis~ly:detail~d pulse-coded messages. There is 
no convmcmg evtdence that the brain uses such a 
system and much to suggest that it does not. For 
these reasons we will not attempt to comment in 
detail on these psychological models but only make 
rather general remarks. 
Johnson-Laird1 proposes that the brain is a 
complex hierarchy of largely parallel processors-
':n idea that is almost certainly along the right 
hnes-and that there is an operating system at the 
top of the hierarchy. He considers the conscious mind 
to correspond to this operating system. Thus the 
mechanism of consciousness expresses the results of 
some of the computations the brain makes but not 
the details of how they were done. If there is an 
operating system of this type it is not easy at the 
moment to see any particular brain area in which 
it is located. 7 Johnson-Laird also lays emphasis on 
self-reflection and self-awareness, topics that we have 
decided to leave on one side. 
An alternative view, due to J ackendoff2 is that 
consciousness is not associated with the highest levels 
in the hierarchy but with the intermediate levels. He 
arrives at this point of view by considering in detail 
the language system, the visual system and the music 
system. His arguments are certainly suggestive, 
though not completely compelling. 
Both authors emphasize the intimate relationship 
between consciousness and working memory. 
They also both envisage a serial process (that 
we may loosely identify as attention) on top of 
the parallel processes. Thus clearly we shall have 
to consider the mechanisms of attention and of 
working memory. 
The type of memory that will be of most interest 
to us is short-term memory, whether it be very short 
(a fraction of a second; sometimes called 'iconic' 
memory8 if it is visual) or short-term memory 
proper (meaning a few seconds) sometimes called 
working memory.9,lO These are so important that 
we shall take up each of these subjects later. It does 
not seem essential for consciousness that the brain 
should be able to put anything into the long-term 
episodic memory system, 11 since people with certain 
brain damage (to be discussed below) cannot lay 
down new episodic memories but appear in all other 
respects to be fully conscious. Procedural memory, 11 
i.e. that part of memory responsible for highly 
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~utomated procedures, such as typing or swimming, 
IS probably largely unconscious. 
. Con~ciousness appears to be a process that is fairly 
1mmed1ate. In ot~er words, it does not take too long 
to. become conscwus of, at least, straightforward 
thmgs. Exa~tly how long is not clear, but figures 
somewhere m the 50-250 ms time range might be 
reasonable, rather than a few seconds. 
General neurobiological aspects 
When 
When is an animal conscious? This turns out not 
to be a straightforward problem. It seems likely that 
the essential features of consciousness are probably 
not usually present in slow-wave sleep, nor under 
a deep anaesthetic. Rapid Eye Movement (REM) 
or dreaming sleep is another matter. It seems to us 
that a limited form of consciousness often occurs in 
REM sleep. Although cognition is not completely 
normal and memories cannot be put into the long-
term store, nevertheless dreams seem to have some 
of the attributes of consciousness. Whether there are 
any experimental advantages in studying REM sleep 
to help us understand consciousness remains to be 
seen. At the moment we do not see any. 
The really difficult case is that of rather light 
anaesthesia or states induced by modern receptor-
specific anaesthetic agents. 12 It seems likely that in 
some such states the brain is at least partly conscious. 
This would not matter were it not for the large 
amount of experimentation on mammals in these 
states. We return to this problem later. 
'Where 
Where in the brain are the neural correlates of 
consciousness? One of the traditional answers-that 
consciousness depends on the reticular activating 
system in the midbrain-is misleading. Certainly the 
relevant parts of the brain need to be activated in 
various ways, but this is a little like believing that 
the characteristic part of a television set is its electrical 
supply. It is more likely that the operations correspond-
ing to consciousness occur mainly (though not 
exclusively) in the neocortex and probably also in 
the paleocortex, associated with the olfactory system, 
since local damage to the cerebral cortex often 
removes particular aspects of consciousness (as, for 
example, in face agnosia). 
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The hippocampal system (the allocortex) is a little 
more complicated. A person with complete bilateral 
damage to the hippocampal system and to all the 
higher order association cortices that are connected 
with it, appears to have most aspects of conscious-
ness13 (including short-term conjunctions over at 
leastthree modalities) so the hippocampal system is 
unlikely to be essential. But it could be argued that 
what goes on in the normal hippocampus does indeed 
reach consciousness, so it may be important to 
consider in detail the inputs and outputs of the 
hippocampal system. 
Structures in the midbrain or hindbrain, such as 
the cerebellum, are probably not essential for 
consciousness. It remains to be seen whether certain 
other structures, such as the thalamus, the basal 
ganglia and the claustrum, all intimately associated 
with the neocortex, are closely involved in conscious-
ness. We shall include these structures together with 
the cerebral cortex as 'the cortical system'. 
Split brains 
The study of persons with 'split brains' gives us 
information about some of the pathways that are (or 
are not) involved in consciousness. It is a well-
established fact14 that for persons whose corpus 
callosum-the massive fiber bundle connecting the 
two cortical hemispheres-has been cut, the left-hand 
side of the brain (for right-handed people) is not 
aware of the activity in the visual system taking place 
on the right side, whereas in a normal person it is. 
(We leave on one side the somewhat controversial 
matter as to whether the right side, on its own, 
is as conscious as the left side.) This strongly 
suggests that some of the information associated with 
consciousness can traverse the normal corpus 
callosum. It also suggests that such information, with 
the exception of some emotional states, cannot be 
transmitted from one side of the cortex to the other 
by the subcortical pathways that remain intact in this 
operation. 
Blindsight 
It now seems generally agreed that blindsight is a 
genuine phenomenon.15 Certain people with cortical 
blindness can point fairly accurately to the position 
of objects in their blind visual field, while denying 
that they see anything. It was previously suspected 
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that the neural pathway was subcortical, through the 
superior colliculus, but this has recently been brought 
into question. 16 The motor output appears to be 
voluntary and the subject is certainly aware what 
movements he is making. It is now an urgent matter 
to decide experimentally, by comparative work on 
humans and monkeys, exactly which neural pathways 
are used in blindsight, since this information may 
suggest which neural pathways are used for conscious-
ness and which not. 
We shall not discuss here other cases in which 
people respond to a stimulus such as an auditory or 
visual cue, but claim to be unaware ofthe stimulus 
(for example, subliminal perception and priming, 17,18 
and also galvanic skin responses19). Such stimuli 
may affect ongoing mental processes, including 
higher order processes, without being registered in 
working or long-term memory. 
Neuronal firing 
What is the general character of neural behaviors 
associated, or not, with consciousness? We think it 
plausible that consciousness in some sense requires 
neuronal activity, in which we include not only 
neurons that fire action potentials but also non-
spiking neurons such as amacrine cells. 
Our basic hypothesis at the neural level is that it 
is useful to think of consciousness as being correlated 
with a special type of activity of perhaps a subset of 
neurons in the cortical system. Consciousness can 
undoubtedly take different fonns, depending on 
which parts of the cortex are involved, but we 
hypothesize that there is one basic mechanism (or 
a few such) underlying them all. At any moment 
consciousness corresponds to a particular type of 
activity in a transient set of neurons that are a subset 
of a much larger set of potential candidates. The 
problem at the neural level then becomes: 
1. Where are these neurons in the brain? 
2. Are they of any particular neuronal type? 
3. What is special (if anything) about their 
connections? 
4. What is special (if anything) about the way they 
are firing? 
Visual awareness 
At this point we propose to make a somewhat arbitrary 
personal choice. Since we hypothesize that there is 
a basic mechanism for consciousness that is rather 
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similar in different parts of the brain (and in 
particular, in different parts of the neocortex): we 
propose that the visual system is the most favorable 
for an initial experimental approach. The visual 
system has several well-known advantages as an 
experimental system for investigating the neuronal 
basis of consciousness. Unlike language, it is fairly 
similar in man and the higher primates. There is 
already much experimental work on it, both by 
psychophysicists and by neuroscientists. Moreover 
we believe that it will be easier to study than the more 
complex aspects of consciousness associated with self-
awareness. From now on, then, we shall discuss not 
consciousness in all its aspects but visual awareness 
and only the awareness that does not involve the 
laying down oflong-term episodic memory. Johnson-
Laird1 has called this 'bare awareness', which does 
indeed convey the idea that it is simpler than self-
awareness. Although here we mainly consider visual 
perception, many of the processes we discuss are also 
likely to be used in visual inagery. 
The mammalian visual system 
The visual system of mammals is complex and we only 
give an outline description. In the macaque monkey 
there are many distinct visual areas in the neocortex, 
perhaps as many as two dozen.20 One reason for 
these multiple areas is that to handle all activity in one 
single very large neural net, with everything connected 
to everything else, would make the brain both 
cumbersome and prohibitively large. Loosely speaking 
these areas are connected in several hierarchies, with 
the processing within any one area being largely 
parallel (see Figure 1). There are also many back 
projections (and some cross connectio~s) between 
cortical areas, and also from the cortex back to the 
thalamus, the functions of all of which are unknown. 
The dominant output of the retina projects-
through the lateral geniculate nucleus of the 
thalamus-to the primary visual cortex at the back 
of the brain. This area has neurons responding to 
fairly simple features (such as an oriented edge) 
occupying a tiny part of the visual field. 
The neurons in the higher cortical areas respond 
to more complex features, e.g. aspects of faces, and 
their receptive fields cover much larger areas. The 
different cortical areas respond, in general, to 
different features. For example, the neurons in area 
MT are mostly interested in motion and depth, those 
in area V4 in color and shape, and those in 7a in 
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position in space relative to the head or the body. 
So far no single area has been found whose neurons correspond 
to everything we see. How is it, then, that we seem to 
have a single coherent visual picture of the scene 
before us? 
The obvious suggestion is that at any one time the 
relevant neurons in many cortical areas cooperate 
together to form some sort of global activity and that 
this global activity corresponds to visual awareness. 
This is the hypothesis that we shall try to ft.ll out with 
psychological and neurobiological details. 
Convergence zones 
Which particular cortical areas contribute directly 
to visual awareness? For example, is the first visual 
area, Vl, closely involved? Damasio7 has also 
suggested that many cortical areas take part at any 
moment at several different levels. It is probably 
significant that Damasio arrived at this idea largely 
from considering the detailed effects of various types 
of brain damage, evidence rarely used by other 
theorists. He suggests that the synchronous activity 
in the various cortical areas is coordinated by 
feedback projections from 'convergence zones'. 
What exactly convergence zones means in neural 
terms is somewhat obscure. We suggest that 
convergence zones may mainly refer to the neurons 
(or a subset of them) that project 'backwards' (see 
Figure 1), such as those that project from the second 
visual area back to the first one. Thus the term zones 
may turn out to convey a somewhat misleading 
impression, since such neurons may be sprinkled 
fairly uniformly through certain layers of the 
neocortex. Nevertheless the basic idea is a valuable 
one. It points to the possibility that, in addition, 
convergence zones may also exist in other places, 
such as the thalamus or the claustrum. (The 
claustrum21 is a thin sheet of cells located just below 
the neocortex of the insula. It receives axons from 
almost all cortical areas and, in return, projects back 
to them. Its caudal region is largely visual.) 
One would certainly expect areas near to the hippo-
campus, such as the inferotemporal region, as well as 
those near to the higher levels of the motor system 
to be closely involved in visual awareness. How far 
awareness is directly correlated with every neocortical 
level of the visual system remains uncertain, as is 
the involvement of the thalamus, although certain 
parts of it, such as its reticular nucleus22 and the 
pulvinar23 may be involved with attention. 
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Figure 1. Some of the major cortical and sub-cortical visual areas in the macaque monkey. 
Major pathways are indicated by bold lines, minor pathways by thin lines; dashed lines weak 
or uncertain. The shaded ellipsoids correspond to higher-level visual-motor areas. Most cortical 
areas project back to the superior colliculus as well as to the different maps in the pulvinar, which 
is part of the thalamus. Furthermore, every forward projection has usually an equally strong, 
if not stronger, back-projection associated with it (not shown). These feedback pathways usually 
terminate outside cortical layer IV, while the forward projection terminates most densely in 
this layer. Areas related to the control and expression of visual attention include the superior 
colliculus and the pulvinar, as well as areas POa and 7a, part of the posterior parietal cortex. 
Abbreviations: FEF-frontal eye fields; IT -inferior temporal lobe; LGN-lateral geniculate 
nucleus; MT, MST-motion-processing areas; Vl-primary visual area; V2-4-higher-order 
visual processing areas; YIP-ventral interparietal area; VP-ventral posterior. The figure is 
from D. Van Essen andj. Maunsell, personal communication. For more information, see ref20. 
Binding and selective visual attention specialized neurons responding to very specific and 
ecological highly significant objects, such as the 
neurons responding to aspects of faces in infero-
tem poral cortex of primates. 24 
The binding problem 
There are an almost infinite number of possible, 
different objects that we are capable of seeing. There 
cannot be a single neuron, often referred to as a 
grandmother cell, for each one. The combinatorial 
possibilities for representing so many objects at all 
different values of depth, motion, color, orientation 
and spatial location are simply too staggering. This 
does not preclude the existence of sets of somewhat 
It seems likely that at any moment any individual 
object in the visual field is represented by the firing 
of a set of neurons. This would not cause any special 
problem if the members of the set were in close 
proximity (implying that they probably interact 
somewhat), received somewhat similar inputs and 
projected to somewhat similar places. But because 
any object will have different characteristics (form, 
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color, motion, orientation) that are processed in 
several different visual areas, it is highly reasonable 
to assume that seeing any one object often involves 
neurons in many different visual areas. The problem 
of how these neurons temporarily become active as 
a unit is often described as 'the binding problem'. 
As an object seen is often also heard, smelt or felt, 
this binding must also occur across different sensory 
modalities. 
Our experience of perceptual unity thus suggests 
that the brain in some way binds together, in a 
mutually coherent way, all those neurons actively 
responding to different aspects of a perceived object. 
In other words, if you are currently paying attention 
to a friend discussing some point with you, neurons 
in area MT that respond to the motion of his face, 
neurons in area V4 that respond to its hue, neurons 
in auditory cortex that respond to the words coming 
from his face and possibly the memory traces 
associated with recognition of the face all have to be 
'bound' together, to carry a common label identifying 
them as neurons that jointly generate the perception 
of that specific face. 
Types qf binding 
Binding can be of several types. In a sense a neuron 
responding to an oriented line can be considered to 
be binding a set of points. The inputs to such a neuron 
are probably determined by genes and by develop-
mental processes that have evolved due to the 
experience of our distant ancestors. Other forms of 
binding, such as that required for the recognition 
of familiar objects such as the letters of a well-known 
alphabet, may be acquired by frequently repeated 
experience; that is, by being overlearnt. This probably 
implies that many of the neurons involved have as a 
result become strongly connected together. (Recall 
that most cortical neurons have many thousands of 
connections and that initially many of these may be 
weak.) Both these types of binding are likely to have 
a large but limited capacity. These are the types of 
binding with which Damasio7 is mainly concerned. 
The binding we are especially concerned with is 
a third type, being neither epigenetically determined 
nor overlearnt. It applies particularly to objects 
whose exact combination of features may be quite 
novel to us. The neurons actively involved are 
unlikely all to be strongly connected together, at least 
in most cases. This binding must arise rapidly. By 
its very nature it is largely transitory and must have 
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an almost unlimited potential capacity, although its 
capacity at any one time may be limited. If a 
particular stimulus is repeated frequently, this third 
type of transient binding may eventually build up 
the second, overlearned type of binding. 
The role of attention25-28 
This form of transient binding probably depends on 
a serial attentional mechanism, sometimes called the 
spotlight of attention. 25,28 It is thought by some to 
concentrate on one place in the visual field after 
another, possibly moving every 60 ms or so. It is 
faster than eye-movements (another, slower, form of 
attention), and can work across different spatial scales. 
We suggest (the idea goes back to the last century29) 
that what reaches visual awareness is usually the 
result of this attentional step. In other words, that 
awareness and attention are intimately bound together. Note 
that although the results of attention are postulated 
to reach consciousness, the attentional mechanisms 
themselves are probably largely unconscious. 
Short-term memory 
It has long been argued that awareness is not only 
associated with attention but also with some form of 
short-term memory. We have to distinguish two 
forms, iconic and working memory. Iconic memory 
is similar to a sensory input buffer, storing information 
mainly at a pre-categorical level, i.e. in terms of 
simple visual primitives such as orientation or 
movement, although it may also involve more 
complex features, such as familiar words. It has a 
very large capacity but decays very quickly, perhaps 
in half a second or less.8 Working memory, in 
contrast, may last for seconds; 9•10 it seems to have 
a rather limited capacity (a figure often quoted is 
seven items30), is different for different modalities 
and seems to use a much more abstract 
representation (post-categorical memory). It can be 
prolonged by rehearsal, as when one rehearses a 
telephone number. We suspect that it is this form 
of memory that is strongly activated in the binding 
process. 
Neural basis of short-term memory 
The neural basis of these two forms of memory is 
much understudied. Three broad types of mechanisms 
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might underlie either iconic or working memory, 
either singly or in combination: 
(i) the strength of certain synapses is temporarily 
increased or decreased; 
(ii) a neuron keeps on firing for some time due 
mainly to its intrinsic biophysical properties; 
(iii) a neuron keeps on firing mainly due to 
extrinsic circuit properties ('reverberatory 
circuits'). 
Intracellular recordings show that the cell bodies 
of retinal ganglion cells remain depolarized for 
200 ms or longer following a very brief flash of light 
within their receptive field. 31 How neurons further 
in the system express a transient memory remains 
to be seen. In a memory ta~k in which a trained 
monkey had to discriminate and retain individual 
features of compound stimuli, about 15% of the 
neurons in inferotemporal cortex continued to frre 
for 10-20s after the stimulus. 32 The mechanism 
producing (and terminating) this sustained firing is 
unknown. It is not yet known whether this firing is 
oscillatory or not. It may not have to be oscillatory, 
since a task can be remembered well enough without 
one being vividly conscious of it all the time. 
A phenomenon that may correspond to the first 
mechanism was discovered many years ago at the 
neuromuscular junction and called post-tetanic 
potentiation. This is not to be confused with the 
much studied long-term potentiation (L TP)33 that 
has a longer time course. The terminology for these 
short-lasting changes has now become more compli· 
cated, 34·35 with effects variously labelled facilitation 
(with two time constants of decay, of 50 ms and 
300 ms), augmentation (7 s) and potentiation (30 s 
to minutes). There is also depression (5 s). We shall 
refer to all these collectively as 'short-term synaptic 
modification'. Note that the decay times are in 
general in the same range as the times required for 
the decay of working memory. Short-term modification 
has also been observed in the hippocampus and, in 
one case, in the neocortex. These temporary changes 
in synaptic strength can be surprisingly large (see 
figures 11 and 13 in ref 33). 
Hebbian or non-Hebbian? 
The causes of the various aspects of short-term 
modification are not fully understood but many of 
them seem to result from calcium accumulation in 
the presynaptic terminal34,35 and are not influenced 
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by activity in the postsynaptic cell. For this reason 
they are probably all non-Hebbian36 in character. 
('Hebbian' means that the alteration in synaptic 
strength depends on activity, at about the same time, 
in both the presynaptic and the postsynaptic cell.) 
Non-Hebbian implies that the change is not (to a 
first approximation) just at an individual synapse but 
at all the synapses associated with that particular 
presynaptic cell, so that the 'unit of change' is the 
presynaptic cell, not a single synapse. Such changes 
may form part of the neuronal basis of(short-term) 
priming. 17 
Von der Malsburg37 in 1981 postulated on 
theoretical grounds a fast (fraction of a second) 
mechanism for increased synaptic efficiency, having 
a broadly Hebbian36 character. So far this transient 
Hebbian alteration to synaptic strength has not been 
observed, although ifit existed it would provide very 
considerable theoretical advantages. 
We know almost nothing concerning the anatomical 
localization of iconic and working memory, except 
that (as discussed above13) the hippocampal system 
need not be present in order to remember for short 
times. Both iconic and working memory are likely 
to be distributed throughout the appropriate cortical 
areas, with auditory events transiently stored in 
auditory cortices, visual events in the visual cortices, 
and so on. No case of a person who is conscious but 
has lost all forms of short-term memory has been 
reported. 
Neuronal oscillations 
It has often been hypothesized, in particular by von 
der Malsburg, 37 that in neural terms binding means 
the temporarily correlated firing of the neurons 
involved. In other words, neurons in different parts 
of cortex responding to the currently perceived object 
fire action potentials at about the same time. The 
main theoretical requirement is for correlated firing. 
It now seems theoretically plausible that this is most 
easily implemented using oscillations. There are 
many oscillations known in the cortex, among them 
the a-rhythm and the 8-rhythm of the hippocampus. 
Experimental work on '"¥·oscillations' in mammalian 
olfactory cortex38,39 and in the visual cortex40·46 
indicates that an important mechanism may involve 
neurons firing in semisynchrony at a frequency in 
the 40-70Hz range (at least in the cat) (see Figure 2). 
In the visual cortex, only a proportion of the active 
neurons ·fire in this way. Most of the neurons that 
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Figure 2. The local field potential (upper trace) and 
multiunit activity (second trace) recorded from an electrode 
in the first visual area of an adult cat in response to an 
optimally oriented light bar moving across the receptive 
field. The third and fourth traces show a corresponding 
part of the first and second ones (respectively) on an 
expanded time scale. Note the presence of rhythmic 
oscillations (35-45Hz). The multiunit activity occurs near 
the peak negativity of the local field potential. 
Reproduced, by permission, from ref 42. 
do oscillate appear to be complex cells rather than 
simple cells, so that very few are found in cortical 
layer IV.45 
It has been shown41 in cat primary visual cortex 
that in many cases two neurons some distance apart, 
but both responding to a particular moving bar, can 
show frequency-locked oscillations with no measurable 
phase shift in their cross-correlations. More tellingly, 
the activity of two relevant neurons, some 7 mm 
apart, showed41 more highly correlated oscillations 
(at about 50 Hz) to a single moving bar than did the 
same two neurons stimulated by two shorter, 
separate, moving bars. That is, the correlation was 
much greater in response to an obviously single 
object than to a pair of somewhat distinct objects. 
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The activity of the relevant neurons in both the first 
and second visual areas has also been shown to 
be correlated. 44 We shall refer to these neuronal 
oscillations as the 40Hz oscillations, though the 
frequency on any one occasion is not very precise 
and can vary between 35 and 75Hz. 
Most of these experiments have been done on 
lightly-anaesthetized cats whose exact state of 
awareness is unknown but as similar oscillations have 
also been seen in neurons in alert cats,46 they are 
unlikely to be merely an artifact of the anaesthetic. 
A sketch of a theory 
The role of the oscillations in binding may be as 
follows. Objects in the visual field give rise to 
appropriate responses in the appropriate cortical 
areas. Visual attention now has to select one of these 
objects at a particular location. Exactly how this 
works is not yet known. One possible solution25,28,47 
is that the brain has some sort of topographic saliency 
map that codes for the conspicuousness oflocations 
in the visual field in terms of generalized center-
surround operations. This map would derive its 
input from the individual feature maps and give a 
very 'biased' view of the visual environment, 
emphasizing locations where objects differed in some 
perceptual dimension, i.e. color, motion, depth, from 
objects at neighboring locations. Where this map 
might be located is unclear but parts ·of the 
thalamus,22,23 such as the pulvinar, might be in-
volved. (Note that the pulvinar receives a projection 
from the superior colliculus, an area that could 
be thought of as having a saliency map for eye 
movements.) 
Once a particular salient location has been selected, 
probably by a winner-take-all mechanism, the 
information associated with it must be activated by 
referring back to the individual feature maps. The 
various parts of the visual thalamus are well suited 
to influence the behavior of neurons in those parts 
of the neocortex from which they receive-information 
and to which they project back. Some such feedback 
pathways then activate or synchronize the oscillations 
at the corresponding locations in areas such as Vl, 
V 4 and MT, so that a coherent set of features is 
bound. Of course, the system had to decide, using 
the categorical knowledge stored in the connections, 
exactly which neurons must oscillate together to 
produce a veridical representation of the object being 
attended to. This is probably not an easy task. These 
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are the problems that concern much theoretical 
work in cognitive science and computational neuro-
science. It is well known that making sense of our 
perceptual inputs is an 'ill-posed' problem and much 
'computation • must be done to produce veridical 
solutions. 
It seems likely that, for one reason or another, 
certain neurons in the cortical areas involved tend 
to oscillate at around 40Hz. This could make it 
easier to activate such oscillations quickly. The effects 
of the 40 Hz oscillations is probably greater than the 
same amount of random firing for two reasons: first, 
because spikes arriving at a neuron simultaneously 
will produce a larger effect at the soma; and second, 
because the 40Hz oscillations may promote 40Hz 
'resonances' elsewhere. 
To be effective the phases of the relevant neurons 
must be synchronized. A recent mathematical 
analysis48 shows that a set of oscillating neurons can 
very quickly be frequency- as well as phase-locked 
if there is a centralized feedback unit. On the other 
hand phase-locking is much slower and more difficult 
to achieve if the interactions have to pass over long 
chains of interneuronal connections. 
As there has probably been strong evolutionary 
pressure to produce appropriate phase-locking as 
quickly as possible, it may be a general principle that 
all phase-locking interactions use only pathways with 
as few links as possible; these may be within a cortical 
area, between cortical areas (in adjacent levels in the 
hierarchy), or to and from one or more global 
coordinating regions, such as the thalamus or the 
claustrum. 
We suggest that one of the functions of consciousness 
is to present the result of various underlying 
computations and that this involves an attentional 
mechanism that temporarily binds the relevant 
neurons together by synchronizing their spikes in 
40Hz oscillations. These oscillations do not 
themselves encode additional information, except in 
so far as they join together some of the existing 
information into a coherent percept. We shall call 
this form of awareness 'working awareness'. We 
further postulate that obJects for which the binding problem 
has been solved are placed into working memory. In other 
words, some or all of the properties associated with 
the attended location would automatically be 
remembered for a short time. One very attractive 
possibility, with no experimental support, is that the 
40 Hz oscillations themselves preferentially activate 
the mechanisms underlying working memory and 
possibly other longer-term forms of memory as well. 
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The likelihood that only a few simultaneous, 
distinct oscillatiops can exist happily together might 
explain, 49 in a very natural way' the well-known 
limited capacity of the attentional system. The 40Hz 
oscillations may also be an important element in 
laying down and improving stored, categorical 
information, because at any moment they represent 
the brain's consensus as to what it is seeing. 
Fleeting awareness 
Can a spotlight of attention, moving over the visual 
field from one 1 salient' location to the next, explain 
the perceptual richness of our environment? Would 
such a mechanism not lead to a sort of 'tunnel 
vision', in which the currently attended location 
appears in vivid detail with its associated perceptual 
attributes while everything else is invisible? We 
suggest, very tentatively, that this richness may be 
mediated by another form of awareness that is very 
transient, being associated with iconic memory and 
having a very large capacity at any one time. This 
form, that we propose to call 'fleeting awareness', 
we expect not to solve the ad hoc binding problem 
(as working awareness does) but to embody 'features' 
that are bound only epigenetically or by overlearning. 
Attention can then focus on a subset of relevant items 
within iconic memory for further processing. Because 
fleeting awareness is very transient it may be 
especially difficult to study. Whether it really exists 
remains to be seen. 
Experimental problems 
To understand working awareness it seems clear that 
experimental studies of three somewhat different 
phenomena are needed. The first is the 40Hz 
oscillations, and indeed all other oscillations and any 
other kinds of coherent firing. In what cortical areas 
are oscillations found, especially in alert animals? 
What is their natural history: when do they occur? 
How long do they take to set up? How long does 
any one of them last? Are there, simultaneously, 
several different frequencies and/or phases? Are they 
indeed mainly correlated with objects? Do they solve 
the well-known figure-ground problem? Do they ever 
occur in the thalamus or the basal ganglia? Is the 
claustrum21 involved-it is ideally placed to help 
synchronize neurons in different places? 
The second is attention. Are any of the oscillations 
associated with it? How does the mechanism work 
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in neural terms? It is already known that neurons in 
area V 4'0 and in the parietal region 51 in the macaque 
monkey are influenced by attention. Evidence on 
humans with brain damage implicate parts of the 
thalamus in certain aspects of attention, 22 as do 
certain experiments on monkeys,23 but we need to 
know much more about how attention works 
neurobiologically. 
The third is the neural basis of both iconic and 
working memory. These are neglected subjects that 
urgently demand an experimental attack. If there 
are reverberating circuits, where are they? Under 
what circumstances do they oscillate? Are there 
special mechanisms within certain neurons that make 
it easy for them to continue firing? How widely is 
the short-term synaptic modification mechanism 
distributed? What are its characteristics in different 
places? Is there any sign of a Hebbian form of 
modification? What exactly are the biochemical and 
biophysical mechanisms34,35 underlying it? In 
addition we need to relate the neural activity to 
psychological observations. 
We plan to discuss these experimental questions 
more fully in a later paper and to offer some tentative 
answers based on more detailed theoretical arguments. 
Some experimental approaches 
There are at least three possible methods of directly 
approaching working awareness. One is to exploit 
the process known as rivalry, an example of which 
is the two alternative ways of viewing the well-known 
Necker cube drawing. Here the visual input is 
constant but the percept varies from one interpretation 
to the other. A form of rivalry that is easier to study 
neurophysiologically is binocular rivalry, where one 
eye is given one constant visual input and the other 
a constant but rivalrous one. An example studied by 
John Allman and his colleagues (personal communi-
cation) involved projecting a small horizontal grating 
into one eye of a macaque monkey and a small 
vertical one into the other eye so that their visual 
fields overlap. In the same circumstances people see 
first one grating and then the other, the two percepts 
alternating every second or so. Detailed psychophysical 
studies on both monkeys and humans, where the 
monkeys signalled the change by pressing one oftwo 
keys, give fairly similar results, so it is reasonable 
to assume that the monkey has an awareness of the 
changing percepts. Most neurons in the first visual 
area fire in response to the constant visual input and 
do not change but the firing of others tends to change 
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with the monkey's apparent percept. A similar 
experiment involving horizontal gratings moving 
either upwards (in one eye) or downwards (in the 
other) produces a similar variety of responses in area 
MT of the monkey. 52,53 
The second approach, 54 using cats, is to let the 
animal view the same set of visual signals first while 
it is awake and then again when it is in slow-wave 
sleep. The neurons studied were mainly in the first 
visual area. The general result is that the response 
of any given neuron is broadly the same in the two 
conditions but neurons in the lower layers are often 
markedly less active in slow-wave sleep. This was 
confirmed by experiments in which activity was 
monitored histochemically using deoxyglucose. (Note 
that all this was done before the 40 Hz oscillations 
were discovered.) Both these types of experiments 
are obviously in their infancy but they certainly 
suggest that visual awareness can be directly 
approached by suitably designed experiments. 
A third approach to working awareness would be 
to study the effect of anaesthetics on awareness and 
recall in humans and on neuronal responses in monkey 
under similar conditions. Surprisingly, no reliable 
means exists today to test whether a patient is uncon-
scious during modern anaesthetic procedures, 12 
which usually includes muscle relaxants to block 
voluntary and involuntary movements. Even the 
EEG is no reliable indicator of depth of anaesthesia, 
as it is often not distinguishable from that of a sleeping 
person. It has been claimed, however, that the 
disappearance of a 40 ~z wave in the auditory evoked 
potential correlates with loss of consciousness under 
anesthesia. 55 Four to six cycles of such an oscillation, 
with a period of about 25 ms, can be seen following 
stimulation by a single or a series of sharp clicks. 56 
More work on this is obviously very desirable. 
Much useful information can also be obtained by 
careful studies on humans with brain damage who 
have selective impairment of different aspects of visual 
perception7,57 and especially of attention and binding. 
Conclusion 
Our tentative theory, most of the elements of which 
have already been proposed by others, is a program 
for research rather than a detailed model. 
What are the essential features of visual 
awareness? The first requirement is for a form of 
running short-term memory, an idea that is certainly 
more than 100 years old (see ref29)., We postulate 
two distinct forms of this running memory, a very 
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transient iconic one that records built-in visual 
features and a working memory that lasts for a 
somewhat longer time and can also store com-
binations of features. We presume that parts 
of iconic memory form the basis of working 
memory. 
The information about a single object is distributed 
about the brain. There has, therefore, to be a way 
of imposing a temporary unity on the activities of 
all the neurons that are relevant at that moment. 
(Incidentally we see no reason at all why this global 
unity should require fancy quantum effects.) The 
achievement of this unity may be assisted by a fast 
attentional mechanism, the exact nature of which is 
not yet understood. This mechanism is postulated 
to concentate on one object at a time, choosing by 
a winner-take-all process the next object that appears 
to it to be the most salient. The required unity takes 
the form of the relevant neurons firing together in 
semi-synchrony, probably at a frequency in the 
40-70Hz range. We tentatively suggest that this 
activates the appropriate parts of the working-
memory system. The neural basis of this memory 
system is at the moment obscure, although the 
transient alteration of synaptic strengths is one likely 
mechanism. 
There is also much neural activity in the visual 
system that does not reach full awareness. Much of 
this corresponds to the computations needed to arrive 
at the best interpretation of all the incoming 
information that is compatible with the stored, 
categorical information acquired in the past. It 
is this 'best interpretation' of which we become 
aware. 
Why, then, is consciousness so mysterious? A 
striking feature of our visual awareness (and of 
consciousness in general) is that it is very rich in 
information, even if much of it is retained for only 
a rather brief time. Not only can the system switch 
rapidly from one object to another, but in addition 
it can handle a very large amount of information in 
a coherent way at a single moment. We believe 
it is mainly these two abilities, combined with 
the very transient memory systems involved, 
that has made it appear so strange. We have no 
experience (apart from the very limited view 
provided by our own introspection) of machines 
having complex, rapidly changing and highly 
parallel activity of this type. When we can both 
construct such machines and understand their detailed 
behavior, much of the mystery of consciousness may 
disappear. 
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